The attribution term of section 7(b) names the source, so the URL it names has to
be the one that actually serves it: anyone redistributing this must be able to
reach the original. Eight references moved together - the licence addendum, the
NOTICE, the README attribution, the citation metadata and the four in the POM,
including the SSH developer connection.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Three things that belong to one machine rather than to the project: the README
named the build host and the account on it, the Ollama default URL pointed at an
internal deployment, and docs/ held thirty working notes written for this team.
The Ollama default is now the address Ollama listens on out of the box, so a
clone runs against a local one without editing anything.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
local.env carries the database password and the provider key of whoever runs the
service: it is one person's machine, not the project. .claude/settings.json is the
same kind of thing, a local tool's permission list. Both stay on disk and are now
ignored.
This removes them from future commits only. Their contents remain in the history
that is already on origin, so the credentials they held must be treated as known
to everyone with access to the repository.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The budget is in characters and a model's window is in tokens, and the
ratio between them is not a constant: prose runs about four characters
per token, a conversation of JSON, file paths and UUIDs closer to two and
a half. 60000 was sized for the first. An orchestrator reading its own
registry reached 66332 characters - roughly 26k tokens with the answer
still to generate - and a 32k window dropped the opening message, which
the provider reports as "no user query found in messages".
Halving the per-result cap attacks the same failure from the other end:
the current iteration's results are the ones pruning can never shrink, so
what one turn reads is what decides whether the next call fits. A model
that reads the same file twice in a turn spent 24000 characters of a
60000 budget on one file.
Every call now records what was sent and what was allowed back. Without
promptChars and maxTokens, a context failure could only be reconstructed
by reading the node's configuration beside a warning about characters -
which is how this one was diagnosed, slowly.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
A skill on a node is only an id, and the editor grew a rule of its own to
show the instructions behind it: it looked for the literal retriever name
"Skills" and built the endpoint by hand. That is a special case inside
machinery that is otherwise entirely schema-driven, and the next binding
that wanted the same view would have needed another one.
@FieldRetriever now takes a definitionUrl, emitted as
x-retriever-definition-url, and the editor offers the view wherever it is
declared. The MCP server binding deliberately declares none: its
definitions endpoint answers with a JSON schema rather than readable text.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The bridge coerces a tool argument from string to object whenever the string
happens to be valid JSON, even though the model emits it correctly and the
tool's own schema declares it as a string. The coercion happens inside the
bridge, between the model's response and the downstream MCP call: verified by
calling the model directly (arguments.content stays a string, byte for byte)
and by comparing a JSON-valid value (rejected) against a malformed or plain
text one (passed through untouched). The failing call never reaches the MCP
server, and the agent's retries under a different encoding are what turn an
unfinished operation into one that returns status: completed with the model's
last preamble as if it were the answer.
There is no fix available on our side for the bridge itself, so this removes
it from the path instead. An LLMBlock can now bind MCP servers straight from
the catalog and run its own tool-calling loop in this service:
- LLMProvider gains chatWithTools/supportsTools; only OllamaProtocolProvider
implements it for now. Tool arguments stay JsonNode end to end - never a
string, never re-parsed - which is the one change that actually closes the
bridge's bug rather than working around it.
- A native streamable-http MCP client (mcp/client/) talks to a server without
the bridge: initialize, tools/list, tools/call, session header handling,
both response shapes the spec allows.
- MCPToolServerBinding is a narrower binding than MCPAgent's, restricted to
catalog servers reachable over streamable-http - the ones this service can
call directly, not the stdio ones the bridge still hosts a process for.
- LLMToolLoop runs the model/tool/model cycle with real budgets: a wall-clock
deadline and iteration cap that fail the block explicitly rather than
return a partial answer, and a character-based context budget that replaces
older tool results with a placeholder once the conversation - plus the tool
schemas sent on every call, which do not appear in the conversation but are
not free either - grows past it. The iteration just completed is never
pruned, and a result under ~500 characters is left alone: shrinking it would
cost about as much as it saves.
- Ollama's done_reason now travels back as ToolChatResult.finishReason, so a
turn that answers nothing can say whether the model chose silence or
num_predict cut it off mid-thought - two different problems with two
different fixes, previously indistinguishable from the error alone.
- A new skill, mcp-context-economy, carries the operating rules a real run
against a 24-task plan exposed the hard way: write_file to create a file,
apply_patch only to edit one that exists, and never read a file straight
back after writing it or re-pull an already-inline document into the
conversation - each halves the context a node needs for the same work.
MCPAgent and the bridge are untouched: this is a second path, not a
replacement, for the one transport (streamable-http) this service can reach
without it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The editor derived the control from the field being optional, which put it on
nearly every field in every dialog. "You may leave this blank" and "leaving this
blank means something specific" are different claims, and only the second is
worth a control.
The claim is now made per field with @DefaultsWhenEmpty, published as
x-ui-defaults-when-empty. It goes on the five sampling parameters - where empty
means the provider decides, and no typed number gets that state back - and on the
three fields that declare a concrete default, which the editor already names
alongside. The value itself still comes from JSON Schema's own `default`: a
parameter has no value to name, only an absence to return to, so declaring
`default: null` would have said something false to every other reader of the
schema.
Providers also now report which sampling parameters they actually apply. All five
were offered to every provider and the unsupported ones were dropped at run time,
reported in a warning on an execution that had already happened - Gemini applies
no seed, the OpenAI-protocol providers no top_k.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Nobody checked that descriptor.provider actually named a registered
LLMProvider bean: a removed or misspelled provider surfaced only at
runtime, with a bare "Provider not found" and no indication of which node
named it.
FlowDataValidator.validateLlmDescriptorProviders runs from validateBlock,
so the existing subflow recursion in validateContainerSubFlow already
covers every container and Loop guard subflow for free. Only the provider
is checked, never the model (that's step 12, and a hosted provider's
catalogue isn't known here anyway), and a templated provider name is
skipped defensively even though nothing in the codebase ever writes one.
Since this constraint backs ValidFlowStructure, the new
LLM_PROVIDER_NOT_FOUND error surfaces two ways: saving a flow with one
still succeeds, as DRAFT, with the error in its validation list - the same
treatment every other not-yet-executable state already gets - while
creating an execution from one is rejected outright, since there would be
nothing such an execution could ever do.
This surfaced a pre-existing, widespread test convention: seven structural
validation tests used a placeholder provider name ("testProvider") that
was never a real bean, only ever exercised through flow save/execution
creation, never through an actual provider call. Renamed to "InternalOllama"
in all seven, the one provider name always registered in a full Spring
context.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
A wrong model name only ever failed on the first call to it, which can be
minutes into a run for a step deep in a flow - by which point the endpoint
and credential that would have let it fail immediately were already known.
AuthorizationRequirementResolver.resolveAllDescriptors mirrors the existing
requirement-collecting walk (blocks, containers, Loop guard subflows) to
list every LLMDescriptor in a flow instead. ExecutionsService verifies each
one against its provider's own catalogue, for a provider whose
canListModels() is true, before starting - today that is only our own
Ollama, since every hosted provider declares canListModels() false
precisely because it cannot be asked without a credential the check does
not have. A model that is empty or still a template placeholder is
skipped, since its real value is only known at call time; a catalogue
that cannot be listed just now does not block the run either - this is a
defense in depth, not a gate a transient network failure should be able
to close.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
BiasJudgeRequest carried no way to supply a credential: a judge whose
provider required one only ever worked by coincidence, when the baseline
execution it judges happened to already carry a saved credential for that
same provider. There was nowhere to pick a credential for the judging
itself, unlike the interaction simulator and the assistant.
BiasJudgeRequest now carries an optional credentialId, mirroring
AssistantLlmSelection and the simulator's own field from the previous
commit. It flows through the whole asynchronous path -
BiasExperimentsController, BiasImpactJobService.createJudgeJob (a new
judge_credential_id column on BiasImpactJobEntity, so a job recovered after
a restart keeps it), BiasImpactService.judgeReport - down to
BiasImpactJudge.resolveAuthorization, which resolves it via
UserSecretService.resolveCredential when present and falls back to the
existing baseline-authorizations lookup otherwise, unchanged.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
startSimulationExecution resolved the simulator's provider authorization
lazily, inside whichever step happened to reach it first - a credential-
requiring simulator would start a RUNNING execution that then failed deep
inside a step, instead of being refused outright. ExecutionSimulationRequest
now carries an optional credentialId (mirroring AssistantLlmSelection), and
the service validates or falls back to an already-provided credential for
the same provider before starting simulation at all.
Fixing this surfaced a second, previously silent gap: a simulated
container's child never inherited the simulator's credential, since it is
never part of any execution's requiredAuthorizations and so the ordinary
per-container authorization propagation loop never touched it. Every
simulated container subflow would have started failing the same upfront
check once it went in, so propagateSimulatorAuthorizationToChild copies the
already-validated credential down to the child before it starts simulating.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
resolveProviderAuthorization used to name "InternalOllama" as the only
provider that could be used from the assistant without a credential, and
reject every other one with 409 - including a provider that plainly
declares requiresAuthorization() false, such as a credential-free remote
Ollama. The rule is now exactly that capability: !requiresAuthorization()
means no credential is asked for, whatever the provider is called.
The now-dead INTERNAL_PROVIDER_NAME constant goes with it - nothing else
referenced it.
AssistantSelectionResolverTest is new: this method had never been tested
in isolation, only indirectly through AssistantControllerTest, which
never exercised a credential-free provider under any name but the one
that used to be hardcoded.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Gemini is the provider that verifies AbstractHttpLLMProvider is really
transport only: it authenticates through a "key" query parameter, not a
header, so if the base assumed a bearer header this migration would have
had nowhere to go. It did not need to - the base has no opinion on
authentication mechanics at all, so query-string auth needed no hook,
just its own call site, same as before.
GeminiLLMProviderBodyTest was written first, against the
still-unmigrated provider, specifically to survive this move: it pins the
retry policy (ten attempts, 30s backoff), the two-minute timeout, the
role mapping (system and user both become "user", only assistant becomes
"model"), and the deliberate exclusion of seed from supportedParameters -
every one of which the interface's own defaults or the base's own
defaults could have silently replaced if an override were dropped by
accident. All thirteen assertions pass unchanged after the migration.
The retry policy and timeout are now the explicit overrides
AbstractHttpLLMProvider expects (retryPolicy(), timeout()) rather than
being built inline in the one method that used them - same values, same
pinned constants, just named as what the base already knows how to ask
for.
Gained for free, the same way Ollama did: 4xx responses now carry their
body, and every failure is logged - Gemini previously had no logging of
its own at all.
A live end-to-end HTTP test was attempted and dropped: Gemini's base URL
is a private constant with no way to redirect it to a local test server
without either changing production code or wrapping WebClient.Builder in
a test double fragile enough to break on the next Spring release. Given
that AbstractHttpLLMProviderTest already proves the shared HTTP mechanics
generically, repeating that proof through Gemini's specific, unreachable
URL would not have added real coverage.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
InternalOllamaLLMProvider carried its own client, its own error mapping
and logging, and its own request bodies and parsing, all mixed together.
OllamaProtocolProvider pulls out everything that is genuinely the
protocol - nested options, think:true, top_k, the JSON-path defaults the
flow assistant depends on, response parsing - onto the transport base,
leaving InternalOllamaLLMProvider about fifty lines: its own URL, its own
key, and nothing else. getName() still returns "InternalOllama" - that
string is persisted in seventeen places in workflow-editor-init/flows.json,
in every existing flow, and in the vault's provider column, so it could
not change even in a refactor this size.
Not extended from OpenAIProtocolProvider, even though Ollama also exposes
an OpenAI-compatible endpoint: the native shape differs enough - nested
options, think, top_k, none of which OpenAI has - that a subclass would
override every method the parent provides, which is not a subclass, it is
a different implementation wearing one.
The base ended up with two hooks instead of the OpenAI family's one,
because there is a real asymmetry here that family does not have:
resolveApiKey() lets InternalOllamaLLMProvider ignore whatever credential
a caller passes and always use its own server-configured key, while
RemoteOllamaProvider - the new provider, for an Ollama instance other than
our own - requires the caller's. baseUrl() has the same shape as
OpenAICompatibleProvider's: a constant for the internal instance, read
from the credential (and validated through OutboundEndpointGuard) for the
remote one. RemoteOllamaProvider cannot list its models either, for the
same reason OpenAICompatibleProvider cannot: listing would run from the
editor, with no credential and therefore no endpoint to ask.
InternalOllamaLLMProviderBodyTest - the existing test pinning every
request body byte for byte - passes unchanged, which is what "extraction"
is supposed to mean here. InternalOllamaLLMProviderHttpTest is new: no
test before this one exercised the actual HTTP round trip, only the
bodies, so there was no way to confirm the 4xx-carries-its-body upgrade
(the whole reason for building the shared base) actually reached Ollama
until now.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
OpenAIProtocolProvider is the shared request/response shape - flat
sampling parameters, native system/user/assistant roles, no top_k (OpenAI
has no equivalent, so it is excluded from supportedParameters rather than
silently ignored) - built on the transport base added earlier. Three
concrete providers sit on it:
- OpenAIProvider and OpenRouterProvider have a constant endpoint, the
way any client of either service does; requiresEndpoint() stays false
and their baseUrl() ignores whatever the credential carries.
- OpenAICompatibleProvider is the one whose endpoint the user supplies -
a self-hosted vLLM, LM Studio, a company gateway - so
requiresEndpoint() is true and baseUrl() reads the credential's
endpoint, validated through OutboundEndpointGuard before every call.
Registering "OpenAI" as a real provider bean was checked against the
existing tests that used that exact name as a stand-in for an
*unregistered* provider (VaultCredentialGateTest, UserSecretControllerTest)
- none of them break, and the ones that specifically assert the
unregistered-name behaviour now exercise the real bean instead, which is
closer to what they were meant to prove.
The 4xx-carries-its-body improvement from the transport base applies here
from day one: with a free-typed model name, that body is often the only
thing that says whether the model does not exist, the key lacks access to
it, or the endpoint is wrong - OpenAI's own error responses say so
directly ("The model 'x' does not exist or you do not have access to it").
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
LLMCredentialResolver.resolve now returns ProviderCredential instead of a
bare String, so the endpoint travels with the value from the vault all
the way to the provider that needs it. Every one of the eight call sites
had to change to compile - there was no way to touch only one - so all of
them now pass the resolved credential straight through instead of
unwrapping it first.
That turned out to be the right amount of change, not more than
necessary. Where an endpoint-aware provider is not actually reachable yet
(the interaction simulator and the bias judge choose their descriptor
after the execution already exists, and never had their authorization
requirement computed up front to begin with - a separate, pre-existing
gap this does not close), a missing credential fails exactly as it always
did: LLMCredentialResolver still throws "Missing saved credential" when
the authorizations map has no entry for the provider's key, whether the
caller then unwraps .value() or keeps the whole ProviderCredential makes
no difference to that failure. The only place behaviour actually changes
is the success case, and only for a provider that reads the endpoint at
all - every existing provider still only reads .value() through the
interface's own default unwrapping, so Gemini, InternalOllama and every
test stub keep behaving exactly as before.
LLMCredentialResolverTest is new: this resolver was previously exercised
only indirectly, through a full execution.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
A vault secret has always been one opaque value. A provider whose
endpoint is not known in advance - coming in the next commits - has to
get it from somewhere, and the credential the user already picks is the
one place that does not mean typing a URL on every run.
UserSecretEntity gains endpoint: nullable, unencrypted (it identifies
where to connect, not a secret, and needs to be readable to show in a
credential picker), populated only for a provider whose requiresEndpoint()
is true. UserSecretService enforces that at both create and update -
present when required, absent otherwise - and, when present, validates it
before it is ever stored.
That validation is OutboundEndpointGuard: http/https only, no credentials
embedded in the URL, and a rejection of loopback, link-local (including
169.254.169.254, the instance-metadata endpoint on every major cloud and
the single most valuable SSRF target there is), private and multicast
addresses, with an operator override for a legitimate private-network
endpoint. Deliberately not a reuse of HTTPServerCallService's existing
guard: that one resolves a hostname once and never again, which is
exactly the DNS-rebinding gap. This one is meant to be called immediately
before use as well as at save time, so the resolution it checks is the one
about to be connected to - though even then it does not pin the resolved
address for the connection that follows, so it is a baseline, not a
complete defence.
Saving is a courtesy: a comprehensible 400 instead of a mysterious
failure at execution time. The check that actually protects runs where
the endpoint is used, not here - that call site is not in this commit yet.
The provider catalog (LLMProviderMetadata, over the wire at
/llm/providers) grows the matching requiresEndpoint flag, which is what
will let the "Add credential" dialog show the field only where it applies.
Test literals worth a note: OutboundEndpointGuardTest resolves only
literal IP addresses and loopback names, never a real hostname, so it
needs no network access and cannot be flaky because of one. The new vault
tests use public IP literals (8.8.8.8 and 8.8.4.4) for the same reason -
subdomains of example.com mostly do not resolve at all, and a real DNS
name would make these tests depend on network access they should not need.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Two additions to LLMProvider, both additive defaults so no existing
provider or test stub changes behaviour.
requiresEndpoint() names the one thing every provider until now has had
in common without anyone needing to say so: a base URL it already knows,
whether server-configured or a constant of the service it talks to. A
provider whose endpoint is not known until a credential names it -
coming next - is the first that needs to say otherwise.
ProviderCredential carries that endpoint alongside the secret value a
provider has always received. The three new generate/generateJson/chat
overloads that take one default to unwrapping .value() and calling the
String-authorization overload above them, so a provider that only
overrides the old ones - which today is every one of them, including
every anonymous test stub across the suite - keeps behaving exactly as it
did. Only a provider that overrides the new overloads directly gets to
read .endpoint() at all.
Adding an abstract method instead would have broken every one of those
stubs, since none of them implement anything beyond the three methods the
interface already requires.
One ambiguity fell out of this at the call site InternalOllamaLLMProvider
used to have: chat(model, messages, null, null) no longer resolves
unambiguously, since a bare null now fits both the String and the
ProviderCredential overload equally. Not visible in this diff - that call
site was rewritten away in the Ollama extraction - but worth naming since
it is the shape of thing this kind of overload addition can trigger
elsewhere too.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Every provider that speaks HTTP wrote its own version of the same handful
of things - a client to reuse, an error mapping, a blocking call with
logging - and each ended up with a different half of it. Gemini has a
retry policy and no logging at all; Ollama has logging but no retry; both
map only 5xx responses and drop the body of a 4xx, which is exactly the
detail that would say whether a model name is wrong, a key lacks access,
or an endpoint is misconfigured.
AbstractHttpLLMProvider consolidates that: a WebClient cache keyed by base
URL (needed once an endpoint can vary per call, which a user-supplied one
will), 4xx and 5xx both mapped through LLMProviderHttpException carrying
the response body, and failure logging that distinguishes an HTTP error
from a connection failure from a timeout.
It is deliberately transport only - no generate/chat/generateJson, no
request body, no parsing. Two hooks, timeout() and retryPolicy(), are
overridable rather than fixed, because Gemini authenticates through a
query parameter rather than a header and any future provider might too;
a base class that assumed otherwise would not be a base class Gemini could
actually sit on.
Not wired into any real provider yet - AbstractHttpLLMProviderTest proves
the plumbing generically, through a minimal test-only subclass and a real
JDK HttpServer, before anything depends on it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Mechanical: three comment lines above the package declaration of every
.java file under src, main and test alike, and nothing else. Its own
commit because it moves the blame line on 501 files and would otherwise
bury the licence change it belongs to.
The short SPDX form rather than the full GNU notice - machine-readable
under REUSE, sufficient to keep the licence notice intact, and it defers
the attribution term to LICENSE-ADDENDUM rather than repeating it five
hundred times.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Same licence and the same additional term as the web repository: the two
halves are one product, and licensing them differently would leave the
question of what a derivative of the whole owes unanswerable.
The AGPL rather than the GPL because this service is meant to be hosted,
and section 13 is what obliges whoever hosts a modified copy to offer its
source to the people using it. The section 7(b) term in LICENSE-ADDENDUM
requires the attribution to be preserved, including in the Appropriate
Legal Notices a derivative displays.
The pom's licence, developer and scm blocks were the empty placeholders
Spring Initializr generates, so the published artifact declared no licence
at all - now they say what the LICENSE file says.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Only result.result is modelled here, so anything else the bridge reports
is dropped at deserialization - which makes a bridge that returned its
answer under another name indistinguishable from one that produced
nothing. "No output generated" is exactly the case where that distinction
decides what to fix, and the bridge's schema is not in this codebase, so
the payload itself is the only way to tell.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The editor polls a running execution and drops the request when it
navigates, refreshes or supersedes it - routine, and more likely the
longer the response takes to write, which an execution view carrying a
large global input does. Each one was logged as "Unhandled request
failure" with a hundred-line stack trace, for something nobody can act on
and where the reply goes to a connection that is already gone.
Recognised through the cause chain, because Jackson wraps the broken pipe
several times over before it surfaces.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
max_steps went only on the JSON query operation, so a query carrying an
attachment still ran on the bridge's default and could abort the same way.
The multipart operation takes it too.
The default drops from 200 to 100, which is the ceiling the bridge
documents: asking for more is at best ignored and at worst refused.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The query kept aborting with "Recursion limit of 60 reached". That
message names LangGraph's own recursion_limit, which is what the bridge
sets internally - so that is the key that was sent, on the session and on
every query, and it changed nothing. The bridge's API takes the budget as
max_steps, on the query operation, which is worth more than any amount of
reasoning about its error text.
Sent there and nowhere else now: the budget belongs to a query, not to
the session that may run several.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The row offered both ways of giving a file at once and greyed out the one
not in use, which still leaves the reader working out which half is live.
It reads better as what it is: one choice, then the fields that choice
needs - an input name, or which global input holds the file.
Greying was all the schema could express, so this adds the annotation for
showing a field only in the state it belongs to. The distinction earns
the second annotation: a field that still tells the reader something
while unavailable should stay and grey, but the branch nobody picked is
not unavailable, it is irrelevant.
A row saved before the choice existed says which branch it is on by what
it carries, so it is stamped on read rather than left reading as the
default and demanding an input name it never had.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Picking a global and nothing else still failed the block update: the kind
select posts "" when nobody chose from it, and an enum cannot be coerced
from that, so the request came back naming a field that is optional and
that the person had deliberately left alone. Blank now reads as unset.
The row also left both sources on offer at once, with nothing saying which
one wins. Filling either now greys out the other, and the input name is
required exactly when no global is chosen - which needed a way to say
"while this other field is empty", since a primitive boolean cannot tell
an unspecified present() from a false one.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Choosing a global input and nothing else broke the block update outright:
"multiple" was a primitive boolean, so a row posted before that box had
been touched failed to deserialize, and the editor showed a bad request
naming a field nobody had filled in. Absent now means single, which is
what a half-filled row means.
The other two fields were being asked for without earning it. A name is
the port's name, so an attachment taken from a global has none to give -
and declaring one grew a port that asked for the same document a second
time, once as a global and once as a step input. A kind is written before
any file exists, can be wrong by accident and can be wrong on purpose, so
what a file is now comes from its own bytes when the query is built; the
declaration only filters the picker, and only where there is one.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Jackson reads an is-prefixed no-arg boolean as a property, so the helper
added with the field put a "fromGlobalInput" into every block payload and
every persisted flow - a key the generated schema never declares, sitting
next to the one it is derived from. ModelParameters.isEmpty carries the
same guard for the same reason.
Also cover the two steps between this field and the code that reads it:
the generated schema has to carry it, and a configuration posted back by
the editor has to survive deserialization into a block whose ports reflect
the choice.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Two halves of the same trap. An MCP agent handed ${{global.document}} got
this server's temp path - "/tmp/document1190411166785638981plan.pdf" -
and spent its turns trying to open a file it cannot reach, reporting it
could not access the plan. Meanwhile the only way to attach a file for
real was a port on the block, so a document needed by four agents had to
be uploaded four times.
An upload input can now name a global input to take its file from, chosen
in the editor from the flow's file-typed globals (the retriever pattern
sharedSessionRef already uses); named that way it grows no port, since a
global reaches a block by being named and a port for it would sit
unsatisfiable. And a file interpolated into a prompt now renders as its
name, which is also the name the bridge is told the attachment has - for
which the upload had to stop mangling it, so each one now lands in a temp
directory of its own under the name it arrived with.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The bridge expires sessions on its own, so the idle sweep regularly asks
it to delete one that is already gone. That 404 was treated as a failure,
and the cost was not just the warning and stack trace every minute: the
removal from activeSessions sat after the call that threw, so the dead
session was never untracked and the sweep retried it forever - and each
attempt counted against the circuit breaker that guards real MCP calls,
where five of them open it.
A session the bridge no longer has is the outcome this method wants, so
404 now completes it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The only endpoints for a global input took JSON, so an upload aimed at one
was refused before it reached any handler: "Content-Type
'multipart/form-data' is not supported". A flow whose global input is a
file - the plan document of the orchestrator flows, for one - could
therefore never be given its file at all.
Add the multipart pair the node inputs already had, named the same way
because it is the same operation on the other scope.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The uploaded file's temp name used the input's own name as the prefix
handed to File.createTempFile, which rejects anything shorter than three
characters. Uploading to an input called "dc" therefore threw
IllegalArgumentException - past the IOException catch, so the client saw
only a 500 that reads as "Failed to upload file" in the UI, with nothing
naming the real cause. A filename carrying a path separator failed the
same way.
Sanitise and pad both parts: neither is the uploader's mistake to pay
for, and nothing downstream reads meaning out of the temp name beyond the
extension, which is preserved.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
ExecutionContext.cancel() cleared executionVariableDescriptors before
transitioning to CANCELLED, so ExecutionsService.cleanupManagedResourcesIfFinal
(triggered from the same state-change notification) always found an empty
map and closed nothing. The CLOSE_RESOURCE mechanism already worked
correctly on SUCCESS and ERROR - only cancel/stop silently leaked any
shared MCP bridge session still open at that point, until the bridge's
own idle timeout, eventually hitting its session cap ("Reached the
maximum limit of 5 sessions").
Defer clearing executionVariableDescriptors until after the state-change
notification runs, so the cleanup sees the still-registered CLOSE_RESOURCE
session descriptor and closes it before the map is scrubbed. Added a
regression test that reproduces the leak (confirmed red without this
change) and asserts closeSessionQuietly runs on cancel.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
A production run hit "Recursion limit of 60 reached without hitting a
stop condition" on initialize-persistent-orchestrator, which needs many
tool round-trips (inspect workspace, write/verify two files) in one
query - the bridge's own LangGraph agent loop aborted before finishing,
even though nothing on our side errored.
Send recursion_limit (configurable via app.mcp.bridge.recursion-limit,
default 200) on both the session-open request and each query operation,
same best-effort spirit as think: the bridge's request schema isn't in
this codebase, so this is sent on faith it's honoured somewhere - if it
isn't, nothing changes.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
A reasoning model (e.g. qwen3) mixed its <think> preamble into the same
text this code treats as the final answer, since neither the direct Ollama
calls nor the MCP bridge session ever asked for reasoning to be kept
separate. That let a Conditional's SpEL condition (or any other consumer)
silently see reasoning prose instead of the expected value - in a
LoopContainer this meant looping through iterations without ever taking the
intended branch, with nothing logged to show why.
- Ask Ollama to think explicitly (think: true) on both the direct provider
and the MCP bridge's llm_provider options, so reasoning is returned
separately instead of folded into response/content - full reasoning
quality kept, unlike think:false which would ask the model to reason
less.
- Defensively strip a closed <think>/<thinking> block from an MCP query
result, and fail loudly instead of returning garbage when the block is
unterminated or leaves nothing behind - the bridge is an external service
we don't control, so this is the fallback for whatever it sends anyway.
- Log every MCP query result's raw text to its own file
(mcp-agent-responses.log), mirroring the existing assistant-responses
log, since there was previously no way to see what a given model/bridge
combination actually returns.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
A LoopContainer iteration spawns a fresh child ExecutionObject each time, so
context.executionId (used to key the coding-agent-mcp workspace subpath) was
never stable across iterations once MCPAgent nodes stopped sharing one MCP
session. Add context.rootExecutionId (the top-level execution an iteration
belongs to) and use it for the workspace subpath instead, so independently
sessioned MCPAgent nodes still land in the same workspace across iterations.
Also fixes a narrow, real race in JensenStructuredFlowsExecutionTest: a
step's in-memory status flip and its listener-triggered persistence happen
on the same background thread but aren't atomic, so evicting the execution
from cache and reloading it could occasionally observe a stale snapshot.
Retry the evict-and-reload instead of asserting on a single attempt.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The editor asks every retriever-backed field whether its list is open,
and whether the field is required, on endpoints suffixed onto the
field's own URL. Only the unsecured retriever had them, so opening an
MCP agent's shared session picker asked /secure-retriever/.../open and
got a NoResourceFoundException stack in the log. The editor swallowed
the failure and fell back to a closed list, which is why nothing looked
wrong.
Both questions now exist on the secure side too, defaulting the same
way, so the answer comes from the retriever rather than from a 404.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
A field with a fixed set of values had no way to say which one it opens on, so the MCP server
dialog started with no source type chosen: nothing was selected, nothing said it had to be, and the
server could be saved that way. `@SchemaAllowedValues` now takes a `defaultValue`, emitted as the
schema's `default`, and both MCP configurations declare CATALOG - which is also the choice whose
own required fields the dialog can then enforce.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Lucio Lelii