{
	auto_https off
	admin off
}

# One host, one path per server. This is the shape the catalog in the workflow manager expects -
# ${{host}}/coding-agent/mcp and its siblings - so a flow configured against a remote deployment
# runs against this stack by changing the host and nothing else.
:3100 {
	handle_path /coding-agent/* {
		reverse_proxy coding-agent-mcp:3000 {
			flush_interval -1
		}
	}

	handle_path /dev-server/* {
		reverse_proxy dev-server-mcp:3000 {
			flush_interval -1
		}
	}

	handle_path /browser/* {
		reverse_proxy browser-mcp:3000 {
			flush_interval -1
		}
	}

	# The one door a person opens, as opposed to the three above, which a machine opens with an API
	# key. handle_path strips the prefix, so the worker's proxy sees /<execution-key>/... and the
	# application behind it sees the path it would see at the root.
	#
	# Same origin as the MCP endpoints above, which is a compromise worth naming: JavaScript in a
	# previewed page can reach /dev-server/mcp. It gets 401 - those endpoints authenticate by
	# bearer token, never by cookie, so there is no ambient authority for a page to borrow - and
	# the preview's own cookie is scoped to /preview/<key>/ and travels nowhere else.
	handle_path /preview/* {
		reverse_proxy dev-server-worker:4500
	}

	handle {
		respond "No MCP server is published at this path" 404
	}
}

# The original one-port-per-server listeners, kept for clients configured before the paths existed.
:3101 {
	reverse_proxy coding-agent-mcp:3000 {
		flush_interval -1
	}
}

:3102 {
	reverse_proxy dev-server-mcp:3000 {
		flush_interval -1
	}
}

:3103 {
	reverse_proxy browser-mcp:3000 {
		flush_interval -1
	}
}